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SOVEREIGNTY IN FEDERAL STATES - DIFFERING
APPROACHES
Charles Caccia
Starting from a political perspective, let me approach this awe-inspiring
subject of sovereignty in three parts: first, by talking about Niccolo Machia-
velli, whom I had to study at high school in Milan, and about sovereignty in
general; second, by talking about federal-provincial relations in Canada to-
day; and, finally, by talking about sovereignty in Canada.
We are profoundly indebted to Niccolo Machiavelli for severing, some
six centuries ago, the deeply rooted medieval belief in the bond between the
government on earth and what goes on in heaven. Machiavelli's belief was
that the earthly and divine realms are not a unified cosmos when it comes to
governance. It was a statement requiring courage and independence of
thought. The fact that a century later a French philosopher, Jean Bodin, fol-
lowed by Hobbes, Rousseau, and Hegel, also wrestled with the concept of
sovereignty just helps to put things into an historical perspective and pro-
vides a sense of proportion. The concept and application of sovereignty has
been with us for some time, and it has come a long way. It no longer identi-
fies with the principal or the monarch of the day, but, as all of you no doubt
already know, sovereignty in modem parliamentary democracies is vested
not in the sovereign, but in the Parliament.
Today in Canada, sovereignty is embodied in a Parliament consisting of
the House of Commons, the Senate, and the Queen of the British Empire. It
is of a coming together of the legal authority and the executive authority
through a democratic process which makes this magic word, sovereignty, so
powerful in our ears and in our values.
At this point I must express deep gratitude to the organizers of this con-
ference for having forced me to rethink about sovereignty, a term I have
taken for granted during nearly thirty years and nine elections in Parliament.
Like democracy, sovereignty is a term one feels no urgency to explain. Those
who spend considerable time with it, one thinks, must be slightly deranged or
must be ivory-tower dwellers, or both. In practical political life, the term is
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heard only at the occasional international conference, and then it is not heard
again until the next international conference.
But just a moment. That is not quite so. There is such a thing, as Bodin
teaches us, as internal sovereignty. Here I am indebted to Roger Scruton, the
author of the Dictionary of Political Thought, who writes that internal sover-
eignty is an attribute possessed by a political body in relation to a society that
falls under its government; it is "command over a civil society." That is un-
til, of course, a civil society rebels and takes to the streets. This concept of
civil society and its relationship to sovereignty is one which is still relevant
today. In many cases, it is causing the citizens to question the efficiency and
even the legitimacy, or the sovereignty, of the state.
Let us move to the Canadian scene, where internal sovereignty becomes
complicated because of the federal system. Canada's approach to federal
provincial relations today is quite different from our approach forty years
ago, and from our approach twenty years ago. I would not say it is evolving,
but rather, it is adapting to changing political circumstances. Sovereignty in
the case of federal-provincial relations in Canada is a delicate policy area
these days, not just because of the situation in Quebec, but also because of
the alienation being felt in the western provinces vis-A-vis Ottawa. I am
tempted to add that this alienation is mostly instigated by provincial govern-
ments seeking greater influence and power in the shaping of national poli-
cies. That alienation is fueled by provincial politics, rather than by popular
movements and individual feelings.
Today, Ottawa treats federal-provincial relations very, very carefully in
order to minimize this alienation, whatever its causes. Some underlying
structural causes of federal-provincial conflict have always been present.
While most important areas of jurisdiction in 1867 were given to the federal
government, the provinces were given responsibility for virtually all of the
policy areas which have unexpectedly become more important in the last
forty years in creating the welfare state, health care, social assistance, and
education, to name a few. Yet, the provinces were not given the ability to
raise significant revenues because no one thought this would be important for
financially demanding areas of public policy when the Constitution was
drafted. So, the federal government had the broader power of taxation under
the Constitution, and the provinces had important responsibilities that they
could not finance.
Because we also had no amending formula until very recently, our solu-
tion was to do administratively what we could not do by constitutional
amendment. And so, for nearly forty years we have had a series of federal-
I ROGER SCRUTON, DICTIONARY OF POLITICALTHOUGHT (Macmillan 1996).
[Vol. 24.73 1998
2
Canada-United States Law Journal, Vol. 24 [1998], Iss. , Art. 11
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cuslj/vol24/iss/11
Caccia-SOVEREIGNTY IN FEDERAL STATES
provincial cost-sharing arrangements to finance social policy in Canada.
While this worked quite well as long as the economy was healthy, it became
problematic in the past decade, when the federal government felt it had no
choice but to cut back on its provincial transfer payments in order to balance
its books. Not surprisingly, the provinces were not happy about that.
Unfortunately, this all happened at the same time as many other problems
were emerging, some due to the effects of globalization on regional econo-
mies, and others due to the dramatic reversals of fortune taking place in the
resource-based economies of western Canada. In many cases, the result of
this decade of economic turmoil has been a stepped-up level of provincial
demands for greater autonomy in a wide range of economic policy areas.
Now, faced with these demands and two failed attempts at constitutional
reform, Ottawa is trying a third option. Ottawa wants to prove that federalism
can be flexible, even without constitutional reform. The approach to federal-
ism it has chosen is one whereby they are administrating measures. It is actu-
ally withdrawn, in the words of the February 1996 speech from the Throne,
"from its functions in such areas as labor market training, forestry, mining,
and recreation that are more appropriately the responsibility of others, in-
cluding provincial governments, local authorities, or the private sector." A
further withdrawal has taken place in the form of so-called "partnership." I
quote again from this piece from the Throne, "[f]ocussing on such priorities
as food inspection, environmental management, social housing, tourism, and
freshwater habitat." This announcement is now public policy. In the case of
mining, as an example, it has been received with great elation by industry
and provincial governments. Of course it has, since they can now practically
do what they want. Ottawa's environmental guiding hand has been removed,
but aboriginal people, environmental NGOs, and the public at large have
reacted negatively. They see in Ottawa a government which cannot easily be
pushed by industry, which is safely distant from sectorial interests, and which
can pursue, better than provincial governments, policies in favor of the public
good.
The same can be said for the broader environmental policy area. On
January 29d' of this year, the federal-provincial territorial policy came into
place, under an agreement for environmental harmonization. The policy is
that Federal, provincial, and territorial environmental laws and regulations
are to be applied in a cooperative manner, that is to say, in a manner whereby
only one order of government takes action in a given situation. At the same
time, there is the stated principle that "nothing in the accord alters the legis-
lative or other authority of the governments or the rights of any of them with
respect to the exercise of their legislative or other authorities under the Con-
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stitution of Canada.' 2 This agreement, which can be suspended by any par-
ticipating government with six months' notice, is to be implemented through
a number of sub-agreements, of which only three have been ratified thus far.
Is the public interest going to be better served by harmonization? It is too
soon to say. It is likely to work out well in provinces where the political will
for protecting the environment is equal to or greater than Ottawa's. Since few
provinces fall into this category, the answer is probably no.
As to other significant areas where jurisdiction has been transferred, a
decline in the quality and standards of services offered to people in search of
labor market counseling and placement has taken place at least in Ontario,
while the transfer of social housing shows a spotty record, it has been suc-
cessful in Saskatchewan, but fiercely resisted in Ontario. It may well be that,
in a few years, these administrative arrangements will be revisited and
changed in areas where they have not worked well. However, will the prov-
inces acquiesce without a fight or without demanding quid pro quos where
Ottawa tries to reclaim its jurisdiction?
Of course, internal sovereignty in Canada today cannot be discussed
without also devoting time to the situation in Quebec. In recent weeks, we
have seen the Quebec provincial government in disarray on the question of
whether a referendum on sovereignty, or on Quebec independence, will be
held after the next provincial election. The disarray has been caused by a
young and energetic new candidate for the leadership of the provincial liberal
party, Jean Charest, who has said simply that there will not be another refer-
endum with him as Premier. Instead, he says that he intends to focus on the
economy and jobs.
Contrast that with a statement a few days ago by the former Premier of
Quebec, Jacques Parizeau, a separatist, or a sovereigntist, depending on
where you stand, referring to the disarray. "What is this panic? This is just a
futile debate, it should have been obvious a long time ago that there won't be
sovereignty if there is no referendum, and there won't be a referendum if the
Parti Quebegois isn't re-elected." Whether this is disarray or panic is beside
the point. The political fact, it seems to me, is that the days of Premier
Lucien Bouchard and the separatist government appear to be numbered if
Jean Charest continues to enjoy a high level of popularity in his own prov-
ince.
Finally, allow me to turn to the issue of international sovereignty. Here I
must preface my remarks, and in a way echo briefly what Jonathan Fried said
earlier. Nothing has been so offensive and unfair in recent years as the attack
by the United States on the sovereignty of other nations by the Helms-Burton
2 Id.
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legislation. Not only has it offended many friends and admirers of the United
States, but it has also soured relations at international gatherings. In fact, it
has cast a dark shadow on the credibility of U.S. foreign policy. One can only
hope Helms-Burton will soon become a museum piece.
Having gotten that out of the way, I would like to add that, by organizing
this conference, the Canada-U.S. Law Institute has rendered a great service
to the concept of international sovereignty. Let me explain. After World War
II, many fervently believed in the formation of new structures of government,
possibly federal, which would ensure peace and prosperity, bring an end to
famine, and prevent wars. The United Nations was formed in the belief that
the time had come to transfer sovereignty from the nation-state to a higher
authority. In reality, we did not transfer sovereignty at all, and we know that.
But, we were inspired by the idea of building institutions which one day
could lead to a form of world government by consensus, or at least a federa-
tion of some sort.
Western Europeans, also determined to prevent conflicts once and for all,
created the European Union, a most remarkable political feat, which implies
the gradual and impressive transfer of sovereignty we are witnessing these
days. And believe me, when the monetary union becomes a fact next year,
volumes will be written on how that step in sovereignty transfer will affect
the powers of individual Member States and their citizens. A sovereignty is
transferred, motivated by highly desirable economic and sociil goals, an in-
teresting question arises - is the transfer of sovereignty accompanied by an
adequate transfer of accountability to the public?
In the European Union, they talk about a "democratic deficit." It results
from the fact that the Commission in Brussels has far greater powers than the
European Parliament, whose members cannot answer fully to their elector-
ates for the actions of their commission. Could it be that accountability is the
other side of the sovereignty coin?
It may well be that there is a danger of a crisis ahead in the public confi-
dence in sovereignty, in the real validity of elected institutions as we con-
tinue to create agreements such as NAFTA, the Multilateral Agreement on
Investment (MAI), and the Kyoto Convention,3 or institutions such as the
International Monetary Fund, the European Union, and the World Trade Or-
ganization, which transfer a certain degree of sovereignty to bodies whose
appointed executives are hardly accountable to the public. It is true that gov-
ernments appoint them, and governments are accountable. But this linkage is
easily overlooked, is nebulous, and is quickly forgotten.
3 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 LL.M.
22 (1998).
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In our national newspaper, the glorious Globe and Mail, there was, on the
front page of the business section, a report on MMT.4 It discussed the action
taken by the Ethyl Corporation to this dispute panel, to make recommenda-
tions on the question of the elimination of MMT, which is an additive to
gasoline. The automotive industry - General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler -
has asked to have it removed, in order to protect the initial control mecha-
nism in new models of cars. The Canadian Parliament passed legislation two
years ago banning MMT, but this legislation has stalled because of the origi-
nal trade agreement.
To conclude, it seems to me the notion of sovereignty is very complex
and interlinked, more interlinked than ever before. The old terminology is
becoming rapidly less meaningful. The importance of the civil society is
rapidly and strongly emerging. The trend in sovereignty transfer is not
matched by accountability to ensure the proper functioning of the democratic
system. Distant technocrats are becoming more powerful than elected gov-
ernments. Therefore, if we are to move with the times and yet retain sover-
eignty, as it has been advocated earlier, then we must deal with the trend of
declining accountability. If we ignore this trend, existing and emerging non-
elected institutions will fail to earn the confidence of a public increasingly
skeptical about responsive government. They will be uneasy with the powers
given to distant bodies who make decisions which can dramatically affect
communities, citizens, and their social cohesion. If we ignore this trend, then
the belief in and support of our democratic institutions could be seriously
eroded. We must not allow that to happen.
4 See Shawn McCarthy, Provinces Attack MMT Ban, GLOBE & MAIL, Apr. 16, 1998, at
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